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9
THE PROPOSED

U.S.

MISSILE DEFENSE FOR

EUROPE AND THE OLD CONTINENT'S
REACTION
Aleksandra Lencznarowicz
DRAWING AN IMAGE OF THE IDEA

The United States and European Union enjoy a complex and complicated
relationship, its dynamics so aptly expressed in Kagan's words: "Americans are from Mars and
Europeans from Venus." 1 Despite sometimes tumultuous transatlantic relations, the United
States is steadfastly conmlltted to m aintaining peace and stability on European continent.
This paper addresses the question why the proposed deployment of the U.S. nllssile defense
shield in Europe was met with nllxed reactions, and argues that it represents the deeper
divisions within European Union, underscoring the different relationships between the
United States and the Old Europe, as opposed to the new E.U. members.
The security aspect of the transatlantic alliance is perhaps the most important one, and
the case of the nllssile defense constitutes a test for how the partners on both continents are
able to cope with their differences, and whether they are able to COlne to a constructive
agreement without fracturing the Atlantic community. Moreover, the issue offers an
excellent opportunity to gain the insight into motivations and methods of nations that,
while divided by their historical experiences and current interests, are struggling to chart a
conunon policy. The process of forging a unified course presents an opportunity for other
nations to observe and draw the lessons for their own endeavors.
Drawing upon the current exchange of ideas on the subject, the paper evaluates one
of the more controversial U.S. defense initiatives since WWII, as an integral part of the
American security strategy. Moreover, it exanlines the United States' rational and the
particulars of the proposed nllssile defense system and further, attempts to present the
Europe's division on the issue. Employing the relevant statistical data, as well as the opinion
polls and surveys, the research shows the perceptions of the societies and governments
involved. The project strives to combine and present the views expressed in the literature on
the nlissile defense from both sides of the Atlantic. As majority of the works on the subject
examine the actions of main actors, this paper delves into their motivations. The goal of the
research is not to advocate for anyone side of this issue, but rather to expose the roots of
Europe's diverse reaction, and present its implications for the transatlantic relations.

The Proposed U.S. Missile Defense for Europe and the Old Continent's Reaction

108

ALEKSANDRA LENCZNAROWICZ San Francisco State University

DELVING INTO THE MISSILE DEFENSE CONCEPT

The American Perspective

In order to properly analyze the United States' proposed missile defense initiative, it
has to be viewed in the context of its general conmutment to the security of Europe. Partly
from conml0n cultural b onds, partly from political consideration and extensive trade, the
U .S. entered two World Wars to re turn Europe to peace. The shear importance of the
continent becam e a spark for the Cold War with the Soviet Union, where the United States
found itself firmly conmutted to European allies, the position subsequently formalized by
signing the NATO agreem ent.2 The obligations U.S. took upon itself to protect free Europe
and prevent future conflicts between European nations, has led Am.erican strategists to the
logical conclusion that the b allistic nussiles pose a serious threat, wluch the United States
and Europe ought to be able to repe!.3
What is a missile defense shield? In the broadest terms, it is a defensive system charged
with intercepting inconling enemy nussiles. The origins of the current nussile defense may
be found in, albeit much m ore ambitio us, plans to deploy Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
in the 1980s.4 Much of the research and development that went into it, was used to create
the current scaled down version of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).5 The
United States argues that the nussile defense is necessary, since the proliferation of the
ballistic nussiles makes the threat ever m ore real. M oreover, these weapons are found in the
hands of multiple states and perhaps organizations, m aking them m ore difficult to deter. To
illustrate the spread of these weapons one may consider the statistical data publish ed by the
Department of Defense that shows that in 1972 only nine states possessed ballistic nussiles,
in 1990, as the Cold War was drawing to a close, the number went up to 16, and by the end
of 2006, the number increased to 25 states.6
The United States views the missile defense as a necessary component for its own and
Europe's security. T his is dictated not only by ballistic nussile proliferation, but also by the
international security environment, that is more complex and less predictable than bipolar
world of the ColdWar.7While these weapons could not destroy Europe (unless armed with
nuclear warheads) by posing a constant psychological threat they could b ecome a source of
intinudation aimed at population centers of the continent. The United States is not alone
in identifYing the wide spread of ballistic nussiles as a clear danger to its security.
Underscoring the international consensus regarding the nussile threat, NATO Secretary
General ]aap de H oop Scheffer stated after the N orth Atlantic Council m eeting in Brussels,
"There is absolutely a shared threat perception. Allies all agree a threat from ballistic nussiles
exists."8
While these weapons may have multitude of sources, of particular concern are the
ballistic nussile development and testing programs underway in North Korea and Iran, and
their related proliferation activities, with Iran b eing the p otential direct threat to Europe.9
As far as North Korea is concerned, the threat it poses to Europe is an indirect on e, through
proliferation of the nuclear and nussile technology to countries such as Iran. Moreover, what
makes N orth Korea such a danger is the personality of its leader Kim ]ong-il and his
unpredictability. to Iran, on the other hand, has a system of government, in which decision
making process is divided b etween religious leadership and civilian officials, making its
motivation difficult to decipher for the West. Furthermore, Iran has been receiving a great
deal of technical assistance from countries such as Russia and China, as well as before
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mentioned North Korea that shared its No Dong missile technology, and helped in
development of Iran's newest Shahab-3 rocket.!! This weapon, while still in the
development, would have a 2000 km range and could reach m.ost of the European cities.!2
One view is that Iran's sponsoring of Hezbollah and Hanus might lead to sharing its missile
technology with its surrogates, a potentially destabilizing development, and one that would
not be deterred by a simple surety of retaliation.!3
While the threat coming from Teheran is being used recently to explain the urgency
for implementation of the system, from us. perspective the missile shield would provide an
enhanced deterrence and freedom from intimidation for years to come, regardless of who
the potential enemy might be.!4 There is also an added benefit affecting directly US.
security, the proposed defensive shield over Europe would offer an improved capability to
defend the United States against potential ballistic missile attack from the Middle East. It
would also offer additional capability to deal with the threat, beside an offensive retaliation
or military preemption. Moreover, the shield would undermine military usefulness of such
missiles, and may dissuade potentially hostile states from indigenous development, or foreign
acquisition of these weapons in the first place. 1S If this result is achieved, it would satisfY
directly the United States and European nonproliferation goals.
The Particulars of the System
The proposed ballistic missile shield would be an integrated system with BMDS
currently deployed to protect North America. As such, it would utilize command and
control, as well as early detection sensors and other assets already in existence. The two
additional installations necessary for an implementation of the defense shield over Europe
are: the X-band midcourse radar that is proposed to be located in the Czech Republic, and
tl~e interceptor site destined to be situated in Poland.The installation in the Czech Republic
would provide vital data to the overall functioning of the system. The information obtained
will be used to identify and distinguish the missile warhead from other missile parts (such
as separated booster rockets) and potential countermeasures (decoys etc.), but most
importantly, it will be used to guide interceptors to the projected traj ectory of the ballistic
missile warhead. 16 The site proposed to be located in Poland would consist of ten
interceptors, similar to the ones currently deployed in Alaska and California; however, they
would be a two staged variant that is quicker, lighter, and better suited for the engagement
ranges and timelines in Europe. 17 These ground-based interceptors are designed for
defensive purposes only and employ small exoatmospheric hit-to-kill vehicles (EKV) .1 8 Any
modifications to this platform to transform it into an offensive weapon would require the
extensive, lengthy, and costly changes that would be clearly visible to any observer. The
above mentioned assets could also become the core of the envisioned by NATO Active
Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, to ensure coverage for all
European nations requiring such protection. 19
Possible Scenario
The typical envisioned scenario for the missile defense in Europe would perhaps play
itself in this fashion: a thermo bloom is detected by the US. satellite asset signaling to the
command and control center a missile launch, its size and heat signature, verifYing that it is
an Iranian Shahab-3 rocket, being launched from the area known to be a terrorist
stronghold. In the first few seconds of the flight it is determined that it is a three stage, solid
propellant variant and that its initial projected course will take it to the center of Vienna,
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Austria. T he conU11and and control suppo rt composed of a network of computers and
communicatio ns equipment, part of the larger U. S. command and control system (BMDS),
transmits and receives data o n this threatening missile launch. T he flight profIle and
proj ected target enable military leaders to determi ne the optimum time and place to launch
the kill vehicles. T he system is designed to rapidly provide a wide range of info rmation to
decision m akers, because of the sho rt distances in E uro pe and the great speed of ballistic
missiles that require threat assessment and interceptor launch decisio ns in just minutes. T he
political leadership makes a snap decision to intercept. T he midcourse radar site in the
Czech R epublic, already alerted and tracking the target, goes from standby to active
acquisition of an inbound and relays relevant data to the Polish interceptor site, which
launches at an optimum m om ent. In the n1eantime conulland and co ntrol center no tifIes all
the inte rested parties, including Russian military cOlIDlland that an intercept is currently
taking place. As the EKV closes on the Iranian missile and subsequently destroys it,
everybo dy takes a sigh of relief. While tlus scenario has n ot yet taken place, it serves as an
illustratio n of how vital this installation can be. C urrently, without the shield in place and
operatio nal, the only option the leadership could weigh is the retaliatory attack on the
source. If the point of the launch was located in the midst of the urban area, it is doubtful
such decision would be m ade, no t to m ention the relative value of destroying the city fo r
the act of the few.

Old Continent's Position
What has b een Old Co ntin~nt 's reaction to the American proposal? T he concept of
U.S. installations sparked a heated debate in Europe. This controversy brought to light h ow
fi ckle the consensus within the continent is o n security and defense issues, as well as
underscored the difference in relationships b etween Old and N ew Europe with the United
States. T h ere seem ed to be three m aj o r points of contention with the American plan.
First, some European countries argue that the proposed system implemented through
bilateral agreem ents between United States, Poland and the Czech Republic has no
provisio ns for en compassing NATO structures , and that the core principal of the collective
defense m ay be undermined. T hey wo uld like to see the m atter of nussile defense discussed
as a NATO issue. The policy of the United States in this respect is seen as the continuatio n
of the unilateral stands U.S. has been pursuing following the attacks of 9/ 11 .Americans seem
to b e interested m ore in the results than in the process, the latter being central to European
sensibilities. The United States appears to b e taking an easy road that offers best chances fo r
the success of its policies, w itho ut stepping into quagnure of the negotiations with Old
C ontinents' many nations with so diverse interests, while Europe sees the overt lack of
consultations on m atters di rectly affecting Europe's security as insulting.20 The proponents
of the American initiative note that to bring the m atter to the forum where agreement by
all is necessary, the successful passage of the con cept is unlikely in the extrem e, since vario us
E uropean states attach a very different importance to the threat posed by the ballistic
nussiles.21 Furthermore, it is wo rth noting that the nussile defense is not something Europe
is prepared, nor has technical capability to provide for itself.
Second concern refers to an alleged threat conung from Iran . Even the supporters of
the deployment of the shield agree for the most part, that Teh eran does not pose a clear and
present danger to their co untries at tlus time. Further, Europ ean influ ence in the Middle
East might actually dinunish if Europe is p erceived to b e pursuing American strategy.
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Moreover, some argue that faced with nuclear tipped Iranian missiles aimed at Paris or
Berlin, Europe could hardly be unfazed, depending on reliability of the missile defense
shield, the technology that can not be 100% accurate all of the time. 22 This is contradicted
by the argument that this system can not be justified or denied existence based solely on
current threats, since it takes years to build and it will continue to serve well into the future
against all enemies.
The third point of the disagreement, and the source of a major European opposition,
is the stance of Russia. As former Russian President Putin rattled his sabers complaining
about the West's incursion into his sphere of influence, and threatening to abrogate the treaty
on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF), which bans nuclear tipped medium ranged
missile systeuls, some European countries, most notably Gennany, seems to acquiesce.23
Noteworthy is the objection voiced by the neorealist scholar Waltz, who believes that such
systems are inherently destabilizing, further perpetuating undesirable unipolar World order,
and capable of igniting aggressive arms races, since the best perceived way to overcome
missile defense, is to saturate it with greater amount of warheads.24 The United States rejects
the Moscow's rhetoric, responding that it is an undeniable fact that proposed missile defense
would not affect the Russian nuclear deterrence. The ICBMs are far beyond the capability
of the system to intercept, and moreover, most of them would not even overfly Europe on
the way to North America . Regardless of these facts, Russia used the proposed shield to
explain away recent increases in the defense spending, as well as possible cancellation of the
INF treaty. The hawks are pointing out however, that the efforts to halt the erosion of the
Russian sphere of influence are precisely the reasons why continuing and direct U.S.
engagement in Europe is so necessary. It is also extremely insulting to the sovereign nations,
such as Poland or Czech Republic, to be still considered belonging to that sphere.25
From the Vantage Point of the Old Europe
The American proposal is generally viewed with the high degree of skepticism by the
continental Europe. This reflects not only the objections to the merit of the installation, but
perhaps more so, to the unilateral way the United States seem to be pursuing its objectives.
As the national goals for the major European players vary, so do the reasons for resisting the
U .S. plans. Historically countries such as France led more independent security policy and
were reluctant to accept U.S. initiatives, striving not to become dependent on America for
their defense. As an example may serve France's exiting from the military NATO structures
in 1966.26 Therefore France strongly opposed the concept of the American missile shield.27
Germany, which during the heat of this controversy held the presidency of the E.U. and
tried to find the balance for the countries on both sides of the issue, generally opposed the
concept of the missile defense, based on the premise that it may spark a new arms race with
Russia, as well as unnecessarily antagonize this major supplier of energy to the European
Union. 28 Indeed Germany's recent policy towards Russia that reflects its bilateral energy
deals, can be viewed as extremely accommodating to the point of the appeasement. United
Kingdom, certainly a member of the Old Europe, and the traditional ally of the United
States, has been often conducting a policy that was not always in line with the rest of
Europe, being more receptive to the American arguments, and even favored the deployment
of the system within its borders.29
Through the Eyes of the New Europe
On the other side of the issue stood New Europe, represented by Poland and the
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Czech Republic, who actively lobbied to have the missile defense sites located on their
territories. This area coincided with, what was determined by the United States to be the
perfect geographical location for the installations. However, to gain a clearer understanding
of the motivations for the New Europe's position on this issue, it is necessary to consider its
historical experiences that had a direct bearing on its perceptions of potential threats and
their origins. The failure of the Western European allies to come to their effective aid at the
inception ofWWII as promised in the treaties, and subsequent abandonment of the region
to the Soviet sphere of influence, are still vivid in the memories of Poles and Czechs. This
area was also invaded and/ or occupied by Russia; in case of the Czech Republic during the
latter part of the :xx century, while Poland suffered territorial occupation, as well as
systemic political anu cultural exploitation dating back to the XVIII century, casting the
shadow on the future relations between Moscow and the Central European nations. 30
Despite decreasing popular support for some American policies, a majority of Polish
and Czechs citizens consider continuing United States' engagement in Europe as vital to the
region's security, perceiving America as the only country that can ultimately guarantee their
safety.31 While missile defense shield would ostensibly protect Europe from the threat of
Iranian missiles, both Poles and Czechs understand and appreciate its long term stabilizing
effects, through added security against all enemies and potential threats. The statistical data
indicates that neither Poles, nor Czechs see Iran as an inu1linent threat, rather it is broadly
understood security of their country, and Europe respectively, that is at the heart of their
decision to support the system.32 Russia's aggressive rhetoric in the opposition to the
deployment of the missile shield adds significantly to the support of the American initiative.
The sentiment of the Central European nations is well represented in the quote of the
former deputy Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Alexander Vondra, who stated that:
"For us in the Czech Republic with our location between Germany and Russia , to have an
installation with a few American soldiers is a good thing."33 While both governments of
Poland and the Czech Republic generally support US. installations, the popular sentiment
is mixed and demographically diversified. The most noticeable divergence between the two
countries is the apparent fracture between governments' positions and popular support. The
Czech govermnent steadfastly promotes the American installation within the Republic,
while the population's position is a bit lTlOre cautious. In Poland this trend is reversed, with
the population leading the pro arguments .34
European Union's Position
The European Union is in the process of combining members' views on foreign and
security policies to present a unified front through its Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP).35 This second pillar of the European Union is far from completion and the general
position of the E.U. on the issue of security, was summarized in the statement of Javier
Solana , the Secretary-General of the Council, in his speech to the European Parliament in
the spring of 2007: "On security matters, the treaties in force allocate sovereignty to EU
member states, but that sovereignty must be compatible with the union's general interest in
security."36 TIllS statement emphasizes the fact that the European Union does not have a
cohesive security policy at this time, and these decisions default to the national
goverm1lents. However, the restrictions on these individual policies placed by the European
Union so as not to compromise the good of the whole, may be seen as the initial steps of
the E.U closer cooperation in the matters of security. Subsequently, during US.-E.U
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Slll11l1Ut, at the end of April 2007, The United States and Europe have agreed in principal
on usefulness of such a system; however, many differences remain to be reconciled. The new
European Union reform treaty leaves ultimately such issues up to the individual member
states. 37
Europe's Dynamic Position
Europe's position on the matter of placing nussile shield by the US. within the E.U
is a dynanucally evolving situation that is being affected by the democratic processes within
all interested parties. As an example, the 2007 November elections in Poland resulted in the
formation of the new government that favors closer consultations with the E.U. to seek
broader consensus before proceeding with the project. Behind Warsaw's hesitation m.ay lay
the perceived weakness of the American adnunistration during its last few months in
power. 38 At the same time, the pendulum of support swung in the other direction in
countries such as France, where President Sarkozy seems to lead considerably less adversarial
policy toward the United States and its plans in Europe, emphasizing the Iranian threat. 39
The degree and the source of support for the American plans are also shifting and evolving
within the New Europe, where there seem to be the slight disconnect between the
populations and their governments. In the United States the Congress, led now by the
Democrat Party, has for a time withheld funding for the project, sending nuxed signals to
the countries and governments that have invested their reputations and hopes in the
implementation of the system 4 0 The Uluted States, while undergoing its election cycle, is
focused internally and the uncertainty of the presidential succession adds to the anxiety of
it,S new European allies,
Implications for Transatlantic Relations
In conclusion, the support and the opposition to the proposed US defense initiative
appears to follow the more pronounced fault lines between the Old and the New Europe,
It represents the different geopolitical positions, historical experiences, common sentiments
and myths of the populations expressed through the democratic process in the dYl1anLically
changing positions of the respective governments, Whether the two parts of Europe are
merging or drifting apart, and if the United States helps to unite, or separate the transatlantic
conm1l1nity, will be essential to all concerned, As European Union's specialist Hix notes:
"When the interest of the states diverge the EU becomes incapacitated and the member
states pursue their interest independently of the EU"41
The proposed US nussile defense shield for Europe pronLises to be able to bring
multitude of benefits; however, it is burdened with serious objections, voiced on both sides
of the Atlantic. The possibility of the renewed arms race with Russia, the erosion of the
cohesiveness of NATO, and lack of the credible nLissile threat, are all serious concerns
necessitating further debate and careful consideration before proceeding with the
implementation of this strategy, Sununarizing the benefits of the initiative, the capability to
extend defensive coverage to Europe against long-range ballistic nussiles, which would
enhance the collective security of the NATO Alliance, strengthen transatlantic unity,
reaffirm America's conmutments to European security, and avoid the decoupling of
Washington and Brussels security interests, would be indeed a welcomed development,
Moreover, the issue also represents a crucial element in the U,S,-E,U, relations, and if
resolved to a mutual benefit, it may further cement the transatlantic bond, The question
whether this initiative would fulfill US goals and become a successful strategy in defending
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Europe remains to be answered, the future shape of the World may depend on it.

APPENDIX

Figure 1. Current Defensive Coverage Against Long Range Missiles
....
~

Figure 2. Defense Coverage Proposed by the United States
Source: Missile Defense Agency, 07-MDA-2321
http: // www.ndia.org/ Content/ ContentGroups/ Divisions1 / Missile _Defense/ 0 bering%20
presentation%203-5-07.pdf (30 May 2008).
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